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authors have made this subject to the reading audience. Scotland
and Heys are outstanding medical historians and are to be
commended for their work in this book.
MAJ. CHRIS BUCKHAM, ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE

Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research
During the Cold War. Joy Rohde. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2013. Pp. 213.
The body of historical literature that attempts to define and describe
the residual effects of the Cold War on American military thought
and national policy is enormous. Within that congested environment,
though, Joy Rohde’s Armed with Expertise is a welcomed contribution
as a rigorous study of one of the threads of that period that remains
alive today; the application of social science to military problems.
Rohde constructs her thesis and analysis around a concept first
articulated by President Dwight Eisenhower in his farewell address.
Eisenhower observed: “The prospect of domination of the nation’s
scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power
of money is ever present— and is gravely to be regarded.” 1 Rohde
adopts a quasi-case study approach to examine the history of
a narrow slice of that problem, a close study of the relationship
between one academic entity, the Special Operations Research Office
( s o r o ), and American University in the 1960s and 1970s.
Rohde frames her discussion with the observation that military
use of social science is similar, but not identical, to the other applied
sciences in that the output of the social scientists was always intended
to support conceptual formation of military and diplomatic programs.
The results were not intended to be used as a weapon, but instead
to advance the exploration into how to influence and control other
nations and cultures without undue force. Her argument begins with
a broad discussion of the ongoing relationship between social science
and government, the former having evolved as a means to create
knowledge to solve problems attendant to industrialization in the
early twentieth century.

1 Dwight Eisenhower, “Eisenhower’s Farewell Address to the Nation,” http://
nicadanis.posc.niu.edu/ike.htni, accessed on 5 May 2015.
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Rohde succinctly delineates the tension at the boundary between
the two: “ (Social science) is scientific: amoral, factual, and technical.
But it can be normative, for its origins lie in moral commitment to
social welfare, reform, and progress” (p. 30). The book continues
with a brief history of military-funded social science research, and
the author notes that in the post-Korea and pre-Vietnam years,
during the Eisenhower presidency, there was a visible rise in the
popular use of scholarly research to inform military ends, so r o was
one of those hybrid fusions of academic capability and government
need, and Rohde highlights the rise of so r o by summarizing the
contributions of three specific so r o scientists (referred to as Sorons):
Earl DeLong, Jeanne S. Mintz, and Robert Boguslaw. It was the
collective professional reputation of these three and their peers that
gave the soRo/American University tandem a degree of legitimacy.
During that phase of the Cold War, the social sciences studied the
prospect of ideological expansion as a threat to the United States.
That threat compelled the military customer to remove the research
from the pure “white” of open academic discussion and review, into
the gray area somewhere between pure academia and the military
establishment.
so r o sought to test various approaches to social change, with
an eye to countering the rise of communism globally. One of the
pillars in this research regarded communicating with non-literate
populations; those theories and conclusions echo even today in the
wider attempt to understand how to capture hearts and minds of a
culture, region, or state. At the time, Rohde observes, the researchers
likely did not view themselves as military contractors, but instead as
scholars who could offer scientific solutions to social questions. The
gray area gave private scholars, those who might not otherwise work
for the Department of Defense, a sort of de-militarized zone in which
they could work for both government and academia.
During and immediately after Vietnam, however, the gray area
came under attack. Critics assailed the de-facto construct as the
exploitation of scholarly expertise to both evade democracy and
empower a more militarized state. The ensuing schism led to American
University removing so ro from their campus. Unfortunately, for
those well-intentioned and outraged administrators and faculty, the
action simply drove so r o even closer to the military sponsor, s o r o ,
and others, simply reintroduced themselves to the world under new
identities, this time without university allegiance or oversight.
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The final chapters of the book discuss the consequences of that
evolved relationship between the scholar and the state. Without the
leavening influence of the parent universities, and as research became
increasingly classified by the military customer, the new think-tanks
suffered from the separation from former academic peers. Absent
open discussion and peer-review, their scholarship often devolved into
a sort of group-think, self-affirming and without external criticism.
That loss of transparency caused by the absence of contact between
contracted researchers and their former academic peers left the former
in what Rohde terms the dark area. The translucence of the gray area
reduced to opaque in the dark of the classified military world.
Well written and extensively documented, this readable study
is limited just to the s o r o story in the 1960s and 1970s. Beyond
a few, minor exceptions, Rohde does not stray from that end, and
her discipline sustains a keen focus on the chosen subject. Her use
of a broad array of sources lends gravity to the book’s analysis and
conclusion and strengthens her argument throughout. Rohde’s linkage
of so ro and the military use of social science during the Cold War
to the modern Human Terrain System and the collective counter
insurgency tactics for military, forces winning hearts and minds of
affected societies (e.g. Afghanistan) and gives the book contemporary
relevance in the context of the modern history of conflict.
Even with these strengths, the book is not perfect. From a
purely social-science perspective, there is an absence of granularity
in the author’s use of broad and ill-defined terms like militarization,
which may create some unintended arguments with particular
readers. Additionally, the close study of so ro necessarily omits crosscomparison with other, similar institutions. It would have helped
to place the so ro narrative into an integrated context, but using
Rohde’s work as a primary part of departure this is fertile ground for
future study and analysis.
Armed with Expertise is a refreshing and original look at the
introduction and growth of social science research in a military
context. The book alludes to the ethical complexities sometimes
attendant with government contracting of private expertise, but is
primarily concerned with telling the story of one priva.te/academic/
government relationship in the Cold War, and explaining how that
story remains relevant. The story is instructive about conditions that
existed in the 1960s, while also assisting the reader in understanding
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the nuances and implications of such relationships today. Rohde’s book
is a terrific contribution to the literature in both arenas.
WILLIAM H. JOHNSON, INDEPENDENT RESEARCHER

Canada in the Great Power Game: ig i4-20 i4 . Gwynne Dyer.
Toronto: Random House, 2014. Pp. 448.
Gwynne Dyer’s Canada in the Great Power Game: 1014-2014 is
an examination of Canada’s place in the world as it interacted and
reacted to the changing international system that governed the
world’s great powers. While Canada was certainly not among the
Great Powers, Dyer describes how Canadians made their views and
influence known (or were ignored in some cases). It is a Canadian
perspective on its place in the world, but as a historical work it
sometimes suffers from that narrow lens.
In its opening pages, Dyer declares his goal to “recount the
wars” of the last century and “account for them” (p. 1). He is aware
of the nationalizing narratives that often sway Canadian histories
of its wartime roles throughout the twentieth century. As such, he
consciously takes a position between two extremes of glorifying
the sacrifices Canadians have made abroad, or denouncing them
wholeheartedly. Instead, he argues that the people running Canada
were “intelligent [and] reasonably well-informed,” who learned from
past experience as the Canadian position in the world evolved.
Ultimately, Canadian leaders challenged “the very basis of the greatpower game” and emerged as leaders in the attempt to change that
system (p. 5). From a perfunctory role in the Boer War and the First
World War, Canada helped fashion an international system after
the Second World War that prevented future global conflicts. Even
though it is not a perfect system, Dyer writes, organizations like the
United Nations and NATO helped end the cycle of Great Power wars
of the early nineteenth and twentieth century— at least so far.
Herein lies the crux of Dyer’s work, which repeats in various
ways as he progresses through the twentieth century. Canada shaped
the international system that prevents wars. In his final pages Dyer
praises the “job we embarked on almost a hundred years ago” to
restructuring the international system (p. 398). Yet few historians
would argue that Canada had any major role in shaping those
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